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Summary of Key Findings 
 
This paper presents findings from a case study of slumdwellers in two Wards of Dhaka City. 
The research was designed to determine the extent of political participation of the urban poor. 
The main objective was to gain an understanding of the following question: although 
constituting the majority of the electorate, what constraints prevent the interests of the urban 
poor from being reflected in the policy agenda? In the face of this relative neglect, with whom 
do slumdwellers interact to solve their social problems or advance their interests? In addition, 
the research aimed to analyse efforts made in the mobilisation of slumdwellers, through the 
Basti Basheer Odhikar Surikha Committee (BOSC) Programme run by Coalition for the 
Urban Poor. This aimed to illustrate the possibilities for the incorporation of slumdwellers 
into urban governance. 
 
The analysis of research findings is tentative and cautious. This paper portrays the results 
from a limited and small-scale research, and the author does not aim to draw city-wide 
conclusions from these findings. 
 
Key findings include: 
 
• Slumdwellers identify several actors whom they look to for assistance in the face of 
limited political channels, including slum leaders, landlords and NGOs.  
• The importance of the right to vote as it allows slumdwellers to evaluate elected 
officials and Government with regards to the impact that policy and performance has 
had on their lives. 
• In addition, regardless of the performance of elected officials, voting is hugely 
important as it is the only time when slumdwellers feel that they hold the power and 
are no longer in a subordinate position. 
• Slumdwellers equate their lack of social and political recognition with a lack of 
money, in a society where power and access is dictated by wealth. 
• Slumdwellers are politically aware, and tend to vote with regards to the performance 
of Government or Ward Commissioners rather than rhetoric. Beyond the voting 
process however, the depth of political participation amongst slumdwellers differs. 
• In face of increased awareness, the mobilisation of slumdwellers is possible. 
Membership of BOSC has meant that for some slumdwellers, democracy has led to 
much greater participation and expectations of elected officials, with slumdwellers 
able to press demands on elected officials. Through such channels legal access to 
water and electricity has been achieved. 
• Positive benefits of mobilisation impact upon non-BOSC members in wards where 
BOSC committees are present. 
• For slumdwellers in areas that have not heard of BOSC, democracy has done little to 
improve the rights, livelihoods or participation of slumdwellers. Aside from elections, 
there are no avenues through which slumdwellers can press demands on local 
officials. 
• As possibilities for grassroots mobilisation are limited to the municipal level, national 
policy commitment for the urban poor requires advocacy work within Central 
Government.
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Bastee   Slum 
Basti basheer  Slumdweller 
Hartal   A general strike, usually called by opposition parties 
Mastaan Literally, ‘muscleman’; a local leader or power broker who 
may use extortion or threats of violence to control a 
neighbourhood.  
Thana Administrative unit between district and village; also, a police 
station or district 
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Introduction 
 
‘People think it is a lack of resources that Bangladesh suffers from, but this is not the case. 
We have the resources required to alleviate poverty, but we lack unity and cohesion. 
Bangladesh’s political context has held back the country’s development process, and 
continues to do so.’ – Ward Commissioner 
 
There is widespread consensus, as indicated above, that throughout the country’s democratic 
rule, political rivalry has hindered the policy and programme continuity that is a crucial 
prerequisite for poverty reduction. How can the poor have an impact on policy-making in 
such turbulent circumstances? While this question deserves attention on both a national and 
local level, the urban poor suffer from distinct difficulties that highlight the need for research 
in this field. 
 
Previous research has identified a rural bias in poverty reduction strategies (Rashid and 
Hossain 2005, Banks 2006). With no national policy on urbanisation or urban poverty, poor 
households in Bangladesh’s cities are left to live in illegal slum settlements, in many cases 
detached from the social, political and economic fabric of the city. 
 
Given recent progresses in democratic participation for the urban poor, this research analyses 
the depth of participation of the urban poor. How involved are slumdwellers in local 
governance, and what are their expectations and perceptions of elected officials? Which other 
actors are involved with regards to the urban poor? How can barriers to political participation 
be overcome? 
 
Lastly, while the analysis aims to paint a clear picture of the depth of grassroots participation, 
it also studies the extent to which such progress is limited. How can the governance process 
in Bangladesh complement a ‘bottom-up’ process with a ‘top-down’ approach to ensure 
national commitment for the urban poor and urban governance in which the poor can actively 
participate?  
 
The paper commences by illustrating the livelihoods and living conditions of urban 
slumdwellers in Dhaka. It then investigates the political participation of the urban poor, 
identifying the actors with whom the urban poor interact for problem solving and gaining 
access to services in each of the two wards studied. The research investigates slumdweller 
perceptions of elected representatives and the voting process in Dhaka. What opportunities 
has democracy opened up for slumdwellers? By comparing different experiences between the 
two wards, the research identifies barriers to effective political participation, before looking 
at how opportunities for participation can be advanced. The experiences of Coalition for the 
Urban Poor’s Basti Basheer Odhikar Surakha Committees illustrates the accomplishments of 
grassroots mobilisation of slumdwellers. Lastly, in relation to the successes of collective 
mobilisation, the research also investigates the constraints to such initiatives in terms of 
securing national commitment to urban poverty reduction.  
1. Methodology and Ward Profiles 
 
Research was limited to two wards in Dhaka city. It must be noted that living circumstances 
and political representatives in the two wards are very different. At the same time as being 
wary of over-generalisation, the research aimed to capture the extent of slumdwellers’ 
 1
Banks: A Tale of Two Wards                                                                                                                  CGS WP 2 
political participation. Crucially, the research aimed to identify the differences between 
‘active’ and ‘non-active’ slumdwellers – in Ward A, participation was limited to the voting 
process itself, while in Ward B, collective mobilisation allowed slumdwellers to press their 
demands on elected representatives and city government. 
 
Selection criteria for Wards required the selection of two residential wards; one relatively 
wealthy, and one with a high proportion of slumdwellers. The selection of residential wards 
ensured that results would not be distorted by the additional pressure of business interests in 
the ward. Research objectives were to uncover how Ward Commissioners balanced the needs 
of the rich and the poor. It was assumed that, given the city’s history of patron-client 
relationships, the addition of powerful business interests in a ward would push the needs of 
the poor further down the ladder.1 
 
Ward A2 has a much higher proportion of slums, which have struggled to retain their 
settlements as the Ward has developed. The building of an embankment adjoining the Ward 
has improved the geophysical features of the area, which is no longer vulnerable to such 
frequent flooding. This has furthered the development of the Ward, where property is now in 
great demand. However, it has also intensified the struggles and insecurities of slumdwellers, 
who have faced eviction to improve the Ward’s drainage capacity. As one of the founding 
members of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, the Ward Commissioner has been consistently 
re-elected during his sixteen-year reign. 
 
The selection of Ward B was based on its status as the “elite” residential area of Dhaka – land 
prices have soared and the city houses a diverse population, attracting Bangladeshis from all 
six Divisions, as well as a number of foreign expatriates. The majority of residents can be 
classed as high-income. However, adjourning the luxury high-rise apartments, the Ward also 
homes the city’s largest slum. The Ward Commissioner is serving his first post and hopes that 
his performance will see him re-elected in the 2007 municipal elections. 
 
Within each Ward several semi-structured interviews were carried out with Ward 
Commissioners. In order to familiarise ourselves, the first interviews gathered an overall 
impression of their ward’s difficulties and priorities, and of their views on city governance. 
Follow-up interviews probed their priorities, particularly with regards to slumdwellers in their 
wards. Ward Commissioners were surprisingly forthcoming with their revelations regarding 
the poor status of governance across the city, reflecting the frustrations they faced on a daily 
basis. Although both took what could be classed as a ‘pro-poor’ stance, showing concern of 
the lives of the poor in their wards, we aimed to verify this through focus group discussions 
in the slums. 
 
Focus group discussions consisting of four to six slumdwellers were carried out in each 
Ward. These were carried out in Bangla and translated into English. Discussions aimed to 
identify the political capacities of the poor at the local level, and to compare their experiences 
with the opinions shared by their Ward Commissioners. What were the expectations of 
slumdwellers regarding their Ward Commissioner and to what extent were they met? Did 
they identify any means through which they could influence him and press their demands? 
Were there any other individuals or groups that helped or hindered their attempts to get their 
                                                 
1 This does not, however, assume that wealthy residents are not powerful businessmen. Many of the residents in 
one Ward for example, are powerful property developers. However, by picking residential Wards we hoped to 
minimise, to the best of our ability, the influence of business interests on the Ward Commissioner.  
2 Wards have been anonymised. 
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voices heard? Focus groups were informed that we were not interested in investigating 
perceptions on party affiliation. Any information regarding party politics was volunteered by 
respondents independently.  
 
Focus groups aimed to build a picture of the expectations and perceptions of a ‘typical’ 
slumdweller. In addition, however, we wanted to compare their experiences and perceptions 
with a group of ‘mobilised’ slumdwellers. Hereafter, these two groups are referred to as the 
‘non-active’ and ‘active’ poor. Since 2000, Coalition for the Urban Poor (CUP) has been 
mobilising slumdwellers under the Basti Basheer Odhikar Surakha Committee programme 
(Slumdwellers Rights Protection Committee, BOSC). Its objectives have been to form 
committees through which slumdwellers can be integrated into municipal governance. How 
do their experiences compare with non-active slumdwellers, and how do the benefits of their 
action impact upon non-members?  
 
In viewing the success and the limits of BOSC initiatives, the research also hoped to draw 
some conclusions regarding a ‘view from below’ and a ‘view from above’ in terms of 
incorporating the poor into urban governance – to what extent can mobilisation of the urban 
poor influence upon local and national government, and to what extent is this limited by the 
need for wider policy reform and advocacy work within Central Government? 
 
Figure 1: Focus Group Profiles 
 
Location Participants 
Ward A bastee3 Female respondents, housewives, domestic help 
Ward A bastee Male respondents, rickshaw pullers 
Ward B bastee Female respondents, garments workers, housewives 
Ward B bastee Male respondents, rickshaw pullers 
Ward B bastee Male BOSC Committee members – Small 
business/service holders 
Ward B bastee Female BOSC Committee members – Small business, 
housewives, garment workers 
It is important to note that although some major cross-cutting themes may be reflected at the 
city-wide level, the conclusions drawn here are limited to the two Wards in question. Each 
Ward has its unique characteristics and composition, so to prevent generalisation, further 
research is required before city-wide conclusions can be drawn. 
2. Research Findings 
2.1 Urban Poverty 
 
Dhaka’s ever-expanding pool of urban poor is visible in the expansion of slums on vacant 
private and public land across the city. This informal system of self-help housing is a direct 
result of poor governance; exorbitant costs and no formal provisions of housing for the poor 
have rendered even the cheapest land and housing inaccessible to the poor (World Bank 
2006, Islam 2005, Nawaz 2003). Recent statistics indicate that slumdwellers constitute 35.4 
percent of the city population, or 3.4 million people (CUS et al 2006). 
 
                                                 
3 Bastee is the bangla translation of ‘slum’. Basti Basheer is the bangla translation for slumdwellers. 
 3
Banks: A Tale of Two Wards                                                                                                                  CGS WP 2 
Slums are defined by their country-specific characteristics rather than a universal definition. 
Bangladesh-specific characteristics include; low quality housing; high population density and 
room crowding; very poor environmental services; low socio-economic status; and a lack of 
security of tenure (CUS et al 2006). It is estimated that while almost seventy percent of 
Dhaka’s population is classed as ‘low-income’, this population has access, but not ownership, 
to only twenty percent of the city’s land (BURT 2005). 
 
Failures in urban governance impact hardest upon the most vulnerable households, who face 
social, economic, political and cultural marginalisation. Low incomes, poor health, 
employment difficulties, barriers to service access, environmental hazards and gender 
disparities all play a role in urban poverty. A recent study by CUS (2006) gives a snapshot of 
living conditions in slums across Dhaka, as illustrated below.  
 
Legal access to services poses a significant challenge to slumdwellers. While around 95% of 
households have access to electricity, only 57.6% of households can access cooking gas 
(CUS et al 2006). Focus groups expressed this as a major concern. The purchase of 
alternative fuels was significantly more costly, and shortages had serious repercussions for 
health. Respondents highlighted that they were unable to purify the river water they drank, 
stating that, ‘…we are frequently infected with water-borne diseases and have to pay if 
someone is hospitalised’.  
 
Municipal taps and tubewells provide the major source for drinking water, with only a small 
proportion of households indicating that they collect water from other sources such as rivers, 
ponds or canals. In both wards, focus groups noted, that NGO-installed tubewells were now 
out of order.  
 
Only just over 35% of households use hygienic latrines (CUS et al 2006). Residents in Ward 
B suggested that NGOs have established proper sanitation systems and raised awareness 
about hygiene. While over half of slums in Dhaka received regular garbage collection, a 
further 35% had no collections at all, leading to waste disposal in open spaces and water 
bodies (CUS et al 2006). Poor drainage in nearly 60% of slums ensures that many slums are 
at risk from annual flooding. Poor environmental services are thus major contributors to the 
vulnerability of slumdwellers. Consequently, urban slumdwellers are identified as a 
particularly vulnerable group in terms of health by Bangladesh’s PRSP (GoB 2005). 
 
The status of female-headed households is worse than their male-headed counterparts, with 
women and children being particularly vulnerable to extreme manifestations of poverty 
(BURT 2005, GoB 2005, Barkat 2003). Female respondents did, however, specify that there 
were more employment opportunities for women in the city, especially as garment workers or 
housemaids. Respondents suggested that their relative invisibility in the city provided women 
with the means to earn a livelihood. This was impossible in their home villages, where they 
specified that women are chastised for working outside the home.  
 
Previous assumptions have suggested that rapid urban growth has been fuelled by rural 
migration. A dichotomy of ‘push’ and ‘pull’ factors can be identified as contributing factors 
to migration to urban areas. Contrary to initial beliefs, however, the rural poor leave villages 
due to their adverse conditions, rather than come to cities to follow ‘bright light’ ideologies. 
Focus group discussions identified that the major reasons for their migration were poor 
conditions in their villages – river erosion and rainy seasons reduced livelihood opportunities, 
and the limited employment opportunities available in their home villages do not provide 
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sufficient incomes. One group identified the terror caused by the banned Sharbohara party as 
a contributing factor. ‘Pull factors’, such as the possibility of wage employment in Dhaka, are 
simply additional instigators.  
 
Government has been unwilling to concentrate poverty reduction initiatives in urban areas for 
fear that giving slumdwellers a sense of permanency or security will encourage a further 
influx of migrants. Consequently, previous assumptions that ‘pull’ factors enticed migration 
have ensured that poverty alleviation efforts are concentrated in rural areas. Although rates of 
poverty reduction in urban areas are actually faster than their rural equivalents, several 
indicators in urban areas are worse in slums, particularly in health, education, and access to 
water and sanitation. BURT (2005) indicates that while the number of poor households 
continues to increase in Dhaka, their environmental and socioeconomic conditions continue 
to deteriorate (BURT 2005). Although rural manifestations of poverty must be remedied to 
slow migration, this cannot be at the cost of neglecting the millions of urban poor who live in 
such torrid conditions. 
 
The rural bias present in poverty reduction strategies means that the urban poor are 
underserved in comparison to their rural counterparts in education and health facilities 
(Rashid 2004, Barkat 2003). Higher school drop out rates and more severe rates of 
malnutrition show the extreme forms of vulnerabilities faced by the urban poor. The rural 
bias exists within both governmental and non-governmental initiatives, with NGOs facing 
several barriers to interventions in slums.4 Naming one of the biggest NGOs in the country, 
one focus group demanded, ‘they are the biggest NGO in the world, but what do they do for 
us?’ Slumdwellers lacked trust in the legitimacy of NGO programmes, due to their high costs 
and previous experiences, as will be discussed shortly. However, Siddiqui et al note that even 
given such problems, NGOs are still considered the best service providers in the city by the 
poor themselves (Siddiqui et al, 2000).  
 
As slumdwellers lack land ownership, it is illegal for public service providers to supply 
services to slums. This also creates difficulties for NGO interventions, with the possibility of 
eviction discouraging heavy investment. Several large slum communities have been evicted 
from central Dhaka in recent years (CUS et al 2006, Nawaz 2003). Although laws stipulate 
that eviction is illegal without the rehabilitation of slumdwellers, this has not prevented the 
practice. Rehabilitation to peripheral areas of the city also forces detachment from existing 
livelihoods, particularly employment. Insecurity therefore cuts a menacing figure at the 
forefront of slumdwellers lives. 
 
There is remarkable discontent with regards to the discrepancy between government actions 
and the ‘pledges’ that have been made for urban poor (BURT 2005). Urban planning has 
bypassed the poor, regardless of the huge contribution they provide to the social and 
economic fabric of society. ‘Wherever you plant a garden, the bees will come’, stated one 
interviewee – not only do the poor rely on the urban economy for employment opportunities, 
this dependency is two-way. Transport, garments and construction industries are only a few 
of those sectors which are heavily dependant on the labour of the urban poor. Yet this is not 
reflected in policy. ‘Government does not recognise our settlement in Dhaka city. The 
Government thinks that we are worthless people’, stated one discussion group. 
                                                 
4 See Rashid, S. F and Hossain, Y. (2005). 
 5
Banks: A Tale of Two Wards                                                                                                                  CGS WP 2 
2.2 Urban Local Government 
 
McCarney et al define governance as:  
 
a system of government concentrating on effective and accountable institutions, 
democratic principles and electoral processes, representative and responsible 
structures to ensure an open and legitimate relationship between the civil society and 
the state (McCarney et al in Islam and Khan, 1997). 
 
Thus, governance and Government are two distinct identities. The relationship between them, 
however, is most noticeable when it is bad, as evidenced throughout Bangladesh’s democratic 
history. As policy commitments and programmes are implemented by the State in the public 
interest, and not through the identity of the ruling power, in theory this should result in policy 
continuation regardless of a change in ruling party. This has not been the case in Bangladesh, 
as noted by CUP with regards to official policy on slum evictions. While one Government 
implements policy and programmes, its successor has often discontinued them in preference 
for their own, a practice which hits hardest upon the city’s most vulnerable. This viewpoint is 
shared by Kamal (2000), who states that the efficiency of poverty alleviation initiatives has 
been constrained by a lack of effective governance (Kamal, 2000: 6). To what extent does 
Dhaka’s governance structure allow the poor to participate in programme or policy 
formulation? 
 
Dhaka City Corporation (DCC) is the most visible authority in Dhaka.5 As the central 
administrative body, it carries responsibility for social welfare. Headed by a democratically-
elected Mayor, DCC is split into ten zones and ninety wards.  
 
Wards constitute the most localised level of municipal governance, with each Ward governed 
by a democratically-elected Ward Commissioner. Ward Commissioners manage municipal 
affairs and carry out development works in their Ward. As the closest representatives of the 
city dwellers, Ward Commissioners play a crucial role in city governance. However, with no 
fully-defined framework of duties and responsibilities, Ward Commissioners are left to 
perform their responsibilities according to their individual initiative and commitment. This 
leads to significant variation in efficiency, particularly with regards to prioritisation of the 
needs of the poor. Siddiqui et al detail the lack of empathy and prioritisation that the majority 
of Ward Commissioners accredit to the poor (Siddiqui et al, 2004: 388). 
 
At the foremost of their problems, Ward Commissioners identify a lack of decentralised 
power – the heavily-centralised system of governance6 entails major frustrations in the day to 
day running of their wards. Although closest to residents, their power is very limited, with 
decision-making power hidden behind closed doors in the hands of an inefficient 
bureaucracy. Thus, decision-making does not correspond with transparency and 
accountability - those who are accountable to the electorate do not have any power to take 
decisions. ‘If you want something from me,’ one Ward Commissioner stated, ‘give me the 
power…If I have done a bad job I will not be re-elected. This will be my judgement day’.  
 
                                                 
5 For a detailed description of the institutional structure of metropolitan governance, see Banks 2006. 
6 Although an autonomous body, Central Government holds great power over DCC. In addition, the structure of 
DCC is also very centralised, with the majority of powers held in DCC head office rather than decentralised to 
the zone or ward level. 
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Centralised power also undermines independent political representation. While democratic 
elections lift the voices of the poor at the local level, this is not echoed into policy or priority 
due to the weakness of Ward Commissioners in relation to DCC, and more importantly due to 
the weakness of DCC in relation to Central Government. 
 
One of the most significant achievements with regards to the participation of the urban poor 
has been the extension of the democratic municipal election process to incorporate the poor.7 
Slumdwellers achieved voting rights before the Mayoral election of 1994. Previously, the 
electorate constituted only 9% of the city’s population, as voting rights were dependant on 
property, income and qualifications. Voting tended to be based on kinship and group interests 
rather than on city welfare (Khan, 1997: 9). In face of the introduction of voting rights for the 
poor, it becomes impossible to refute the proposition that representation and participation of 
the poor have come a long way. However, crucial questions arise regarding the depth of this 
participation. 
 
A representative contemporary definition of political participation is, ‘all voluntary activities 
by private individuals which seek, either directly or indirectly, to influence political decisions 
on different levels of the political system’ (Kersting and Sperberg, 2003: 153). This study 
extends the scope of participation beyond a ‘political’ definition to incorporate any form of 
participation through which slumdwellers aim to solve social problems. In essence, the 
importance of participation allows individuals to take the initiative to become involved in 
issues that affect their lives (Khan, 1997: 18). This extension is necessary to fully understand 
the depth of participation of the urban poor. Traditionally excluded from the social and 
political fabric of society, it is important to identify with whom they interact to gain access to 
facilities and services.  
 
Siddiqui et al (2004) argue that participation by the general public has been limited to simply 
voting in municipal elections (Siddiqui et al, 2004: 389). Earlier studies indicate that a lack of 
participation by the general public allowed DCC to reach a state whereby the role of interest 
groups and the ruling party became dominant over and above public interest in decision-
making (Rajbangshi (1986) in Khan, 1997: 18). In the face of this, slumdwellers identify 
several other actors with whom they interact to solve their problems, such as mastaans, 
landlords and NGOs. They also identify negative interactions with the police. While earlier 
studies of slumdwellers have identified a ‘culture of poverty’ in which city slumdwellers face 
considerable social exclusion (Lewis, in Berg-Schlosser and Kersting, 2003: 4), today’s 
experiences in Bangladesh indicate that the urban poor now have more avenues of both 
traditional and non-traditional political participation, which will be discussed in section three. 
 
However, although the poor enjoy voting rights, they have no effective voice to force pro-
active reforms exercising their majority in the electoral system (Kamal, 2000: 2). What are 
the underlying causes of the urban poor’s inability to project their voices for political change? 
Kamal (2000) attributes this inability to a lack of accountability – the absence of effective 
constitutional and political structures that regulate and influence the transparency and 
accountability of governance (Kamal, 2000: 3). How does this fit in with the experiences of 
the poor in the two wards studied? Section three identifies avenues of participation open to 
                                                 
7 Democratic elections have also been blamed for an increase in corruption, for reinforcing political networks 
and policies that favour the elite and for DCC’s lack of autonomy. Ruling parties are unwilling to transfer 
significant power to city Mayors for fear the position will be captured by the opposition. The loss of Mayor to 
the opposition party in 1994, for example, has been named as one of the contributing factors to the decline of the 
BNP which lost power in the next election.  See Banks (2006) for further detail. 
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slumdwellers. In the process it investigates the depth of their participation and constraints to 
further participation. Section four then investigates the success of BOSC in mobilising poor 
communities across Dhaka city. Finally, it also notes that with the impacts of grassroots 
mobilisation limited to the local level (DCC), the recognition of urban poverty at a national 
level requires further action. 
 
3. Political Participation of the Urban Poor 
3.1 Traditional and Non-traditional Political Participation 
 
The most conventional form of participation for slumdwellers is the voting process in local 
and national elections. Both Dhaka’s Mayor and Ward Commissioners are directly elected by 
residents. Bangladesh’s patron-client hierarchy has meant that clientelistic relationships have 
personalised the nature of politics. The use of personal contacts with politicians or officials, 
for example, is often a more successful solution to grievance resolution than formal 
complaint channels, particularly in service delivery (World Bank 2002). The role of the 
mastaan makes connections between slums and political leaders, in which a votebank 
mobilised by a mastaan is exchanged with elected officials for improved services or other 
benefits. This has become an important element in Dhaka’s political context, and will be 
discussed further below. 
 
Non-traditional forms of participation include those of controversial legality which do not 
correspond to laws that regulate participation, such as demonstrations, building occupations, 
and petitioning. The latter have been very visible given the intense rivalry between 
Bangladesh’s two main parties. With 2006 being an election year, hartals (or strikes) are a 
regular occurrence for political as well as economic reasons. The poor are often paid to 
partake in political demonstrations. One respondent mentioned that, ‘If anyone is in financial 
crisis, and he is offered 100 taka, why would he not go to the demonstration?’ Slumdwellers 
also mentioned that during programmes initiated by the ruling party, political workers closed 
access roads to the slum to force all slumdwellers to go to their programme.  
 
It is important however, to assess the depth of participation with regards to any external 
pressures felt in carrying out political activities. Such activities include ‘vote-buying’ - the 
practice of payments in exchange for votes - or payments to facilitate presence at protests and 
demonstrations. In such cases, monetary obligations become the major facilitator behind 
participation or voting behaviour, thus undermining the idea of independent political 
representation of the poor.  
 
3.2 Ward Commissioners and the Poor: Perceptions and Expectations 
 
Official duties of Ward Commissioners are limited to managing development works and the 
day-to-day running of their Ward. What do slumdwellers expect their Ward Commissioner to 
do on behalf of the poor? 
 
First and foremost, all focus groups identified that the most important characteristic of a 
Ward Commissioner is simply to maintain a presence and show an interest in the lives of the 
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slumdwellers. Such perceptions ranged from ‘We do not expect a lot, simply to keep in 
touch’, to ‘he must communicate with the people’, or, ‘he must be an easygoing person so 
that we can approach him’.  
 
This helps to distinguish between the disillusionment experienced in Ward A and the 
satisfaction experienced in Ward B. In Ward B the Commissioner was widely praised for his 
regular visits to the slums, his concern for them, and his approachability. A different role was 
identified in Ward A where the Ward Commissioner was unreachable. Respondents noted 
that he had never been to see them since the election, they were unsure of his office location, 
and they noted that it was impossible to meet him directly– one had to first make an 
appointment through his associates.  
 
The different responses of each Ward Commissioner under similar circumstances can help to 
illustrate this distinction. In both wards, male respondents detailed that at one point, a 
rickshaw had been stolen. In each case, the rickshaw puller requested help from their Ward 
Commissioner. In Ward A, the Ward Commissioner did not deal with the problem himself, 
but instead sent him to an associate, another influential person in the ward. In Ward B 
however, the Ward Commissioner came to the slum himself and directly exerted his influence 
to find the thief and recover the rickshaw. Although both respondents had their rickshaws 
returned, the experience of Ward B was viewed much more favourably. The disinterest 
showed by the Ward Commissioner in Ward A illustrated to the slumdwellers that they were 
not a priority for them. 
 
Ward Commissioners identified that their most important duty with regards to the poor was 
to, ‘help them live a peaceful life’. Informal dispute resolution was one of the main activities 
that they carried out in this sphere, as well as activities both had taken to eradicate criminal 
behaviour. Informal dispute resolution was named as a characteristic of a good Ward 
Commissioner on all accounts. However, in general the Ward Commissioner was not the first 
port of call for resolving grievances, but was seen as a further actor who could be utilised if 
other avenues were not possible. This will be detailed in the following section. Performances 
by Ward Commissioners again varied dramatically – while respondents in Ward A had 
difficulties contacting their Ward Commissioner, respondents in Ward B praised the Ward 
Commissioner for coming to the slum himself. While in Ward B the Ward Commissioner 
was applauded for immersing himself in the problems of poor slumdwellers, in Ward A there 
was no contact between the Ward Commissioner and slumdwellers - ‘He does not give heed 
to our affairs’ stated male respondents. 
 
Neutrality was also identified as an important characteristic of a ‘good’ Ward Commissioner. 
‘He should keep it in his mind that he is an agent of the people. He should measure all people 
equally, and be honest and neutral’. This importance is stark when it is considered that a 
frequent practice in informal dispute resolution is that in the majority of cases, a positive 
verdict is given to whichever party was affiliated with his political party. This occurrence was 
noted by several groups. Ward B respondents also suggested that political affiliation impacts 
upon access to officials, stating that, ‘When he comes, he talks first with his party members, 
and then the others’. This may, however, simply be because party members provide him with 
an entry point to the slums, as discussion surroundings his visits were otherwise entirely 
positive. Male non-BOSC respondents were the only group that specified the Ward 
Commissioner had not visited the slum since elections. It is impossible for the Ward 
Commissioner to cross paths with all slumdwellers, and as such, his visits may be limited to 
 9
Banks: A Tale of Two Wards                                                                                                                  CGS WP 2 
those he has contacts with. Furthermore, it is likely that as rickshaw pullers, this group may 
be working outside of the slum at times when the Ward Commissioner is likely to visit. 
 
One focus group in Ward B highlighted that they tended not to go to the Ward Commissioner 
for personal purposes, although if someone had a problem that could not be solved or needed 
a certificate, they could go to his office. Instead, they viewed the Ward Commissioner’s duty 
as to look after their collective requirements, such as roads, street lamps or water pumps. 
Slumdwellers in Ward A made no suggestions of pressing collective demands on the Ward 
Commissioner. Although they recognised the power of collective might, they could identify 
no platform through which they could press their demands. This will be further analysed in 
section 2.5.  
 
All groups suggested that a good Ward Commissioner would provide them with a primary 
school for their children, good roads, street lighting, and healthcare facilities. Of these, only 
street lighting and roads are within the jurisdiction of Ward Commissioners. In Ward B, 
slumdwellers were enthusiastic about improvements in both the roads and street lighting 
within the slum since the present Ward Commissioner was elected. Slumdwellers in Ward A 
received no such resources in the slum, although they did appreciate the indirect benefit of 
improved roads elsewhere in the ward.  
 
Several groups also mentioned that they would like a savings and credit cooperative to be 
organised under the Ward Commissioner, as they did not trust those run by NGOs. The 
distribution of monetary and food assistance was also indicated as a desirable quality. Both 
Ward Commissioners indicated that they gave food assistance in emergency situations, and 
helped with medical expenses from their own pockets. During festival times they collected 
monetary donations for the slumdwellers.  
 
Slumdwellers in the two wards placed different emphasis on their definition of a ‘good’ Ward 
Commissioner. In Ward A, respondents emphasised personal qualities and duties, such as 
‘being approachable’ and ‘keeping in touch’. Although these were also mentioned in Ward B, 
here more priority seemed to be placed on tangible responsibilities such as carrying out more 
development works in the slum. Higher expectations have arisen due to the differences in 
performance by respective Ward Commissioners. Since the Ward Commissioner performed 
much more positively in the first aspect in Ward B, his residents placed more emphasis on the 
things that they would like him to do more of. In Ward A on the other hand, feeling neglected 
and unable to press their demands on the Ward Commissioner, slumdwellers saw these 
qualities as a crucial foundation to a relationship with the Ward Commissioner, which could 
hopefully lead to development in the future. 
 
When asked to identify characteristics they associated with a bad Ward Commissioner, 
respondents suggested that a bad Commissioner was simply one that didn’t fulfil the criteria 
of a good Ward Commissioner, ‘…And if any Ward Commissioner has no feature like this, he 
would be a bad commissioner’. ‘Bad’ Ward Commissioners therefore, offer greetings and 
respect during election campaigns, but never visit after winning the election. They do not 
worry about the slumdwellers concerns, and do not try to provide services to the 
slumdwellers. 
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3.3 Other Forms of Political Participation 
 
Political participation is not limited to interactions with Ward Commissioners. In fact, 
respondents suggested that the Ward Commissioner would not be their first calling point in 
most instances. Focus Groups identified four other avenues for problem resolution or service 
delivery; NGOs; government services; mastaans; and landlords. In addition, respondents 
highlighted their negative experiences with the police, due to the police force becoming 
increasingly used for political ends. 
NGOs 
 
One of the most interesting findings regarding NGOs was the substantial doubt and suspicion 
that was identified throughout all focus group discussions about NGOs. While the more 
extreme views came from BOSC members, non-members mentioned the high costs involved 
and problems with accessing certain services.  
 
Responses surrounding NGOs were overwhelmingly negative.8 The opinions of BOSC 
respondents tended to be overarching criticisms of NGOs in general rather than particular 
experiences. This was in contrast to non-BOSC respondents who described specific incidents 
with NGOs. ‘It seems more like they develop themselves’, stated one BOSC group. ‘NGOs 
have been exploiting the poor in the name of poverty reduction’, stated another. BOSC 
committees identify two problems. Firstly, they feel that while slumdwellers have learnt a lot 
from NGOs regarding social and legal awareness, hygiene and sanitation, the NGOs have 
developed themselves more, highlighting the misery of the poor in order to gain more funds. 
‘We get awareness while NGO staff get rich’, BOSC respondents asserted.  
 
The second problem they identified was that NGO programmes in urban areas were simply 
not meeting the primary requirements of slumdwellers. At the forefront of their daily 
struggles was their insecurity – slumdwellers are vulnerable to the threat of eviction at any 
time. Consequently, their primary need is security of tenure, which would allow them the 
stability and security that is a prerequisite to the development of their housing.9 The crucial 
prerequisite to investment in housing is security – without this, households are unwilling to 
channel funds into improvements that will be lost in case of eviction. 
 
This is not to say that slumdwellers did not appreciate those NGO interventions in sanitation 
and services that did reach them. However, they did stipulate that in face of the eviction 
threat, these were wasted. Like building a house without first building the foundations, at the 
end of the day they will crumble, having been built on shaky ground. 
 
Non-BOSC committees also voiced suspicions regarding NGOs. However their sentiments 
were not as strong as BOSC members, and were regarding specific experiences with NGOs. 
                                                 
8 This finding corresponds with a national survey of attitudes across Bangladesh by the BBC World Service, 
which found that public trust in NGOs was only slightly higher than the worst-performing category of the police 
(BBC 2005) 
9 This matches research showing that given security of tenure, low-income households will improve the quality 
of their housing in an incremental fashion, undertaking additional improvements when they can afford it. Given 
security of tenure, on average, each $1 invested in infrastructure has been proven to generate $7 in household 
investment (MIT 2001) 
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A history of raised expectations and dashed hopes has made slumdwellers wary of NGOs. 
Several instances were mentioned of people pretending to be NGO representatives and 
disappearing with savings. Other individuals come asking questions but are never seen again. 
One man came to ask whether they would quit rickshaw driving if they could take a loan, but 
never returned. 
 
Although respondents suggested that some slumdwellers had been able to purchase a 
rickshaw or start a small business through microfinance activities, rickshaw pullers were 
frustrated that they could not access small loans. Other criticisms were voiced, such as the 
high rates of interest that they charged. They also detailed the case of one man, who unable to 
pay his weekly instalment, returned to his house to find NGO staff raiding his belongings, 
without first listening to his circumstances. 
 
Focus groups identified several areas in which NGOs are working in their wards. 
Respondents identified initiatives in schooling, microfinance, health clinics and immunisation 
programmes, sanitation and awareness campaigns. Although in the past NGOs had installed 
some water pumps, slumdwellers in both wards stated that these had stopped working. Both 
slums, therefore, experience difficulties with water. 
 
Several criticisms were voiced with regards to NGO schooling. Ward B, with the largest slum 
in Dhaka, had several NGO schools within its boundaries, but these experienced significant 
differences in quality. Certain schools were applauded for their distribution of free 
schoolbooks and notepads. However, inequality even within the slum dictates schooling 
opportunities, with respondents stating that, ‘only powerful people within the slum can get 
their children admitted’ at this preferred school. The social hierarchy within the slum itself 
means that slumdwellers who have contacts take precedence for limited school spaces. Other 
schools were referred to as poor quality – ‘they are not serious about our children, and have 
no headache if the children come to school or not’. Enrolment fees are also often beyond the 
means of slumdwellers. Residents in Ward A stipulated that the 200 taka monthly fee at the 
nearby primary school rendered it inaccessible. Thus, a lack of places and unaffordable prices 
characterise NGO schooling, and provide a significant barrier to education. The quality of 
education is also a concern. 
 
In terms of health facilities, slumdwellers in Ward A mentioned an NGO clinic, which 
although they claim it was meant to provide free treatment, charged from five to ten taka for 
treatments. In this instance, they remarked, it would be better to go to the Government 
hospital than the clinic. 
Governmental Services 
 
Respondents confirmed that few governmental services reached them. While some NGO 
health services reached slumdwellers, there were no governmental health services within the 
slum. Slumdwellers also lamented the negligence they face when they try to access 
governmental health services. Slumdwellers feel that they are stigmatised by doctors due to 
their lack of social status and worn clothes. All groups mentioned that good Ward 
Commissioners should help to provide schools and health facilities that the slumdwellers can 
access. 
 
Slumdwellers also detailed their difficulties in obtaining official services. ‘We were refused a 
legal DWASA line, because when they came to power, they thought that all slumdwellers 
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were supporters of the Awami League’. Slumdwellers recognise that the party in power tends 
to reward their supporters while neglecting those who support the opposition party. This 
practice emphasises the detrimental effects that Bangladesh’s political rivalry has on the 
city’s most vulnerable. 
  
Access to gas was a major priority for slumdwellers. Without gas, several problems occur. In 
some instances, unable to boil and purify water, slumdwellers got ill from water-borne 
diseases. Other groups noted that the cost of wood and straw for cooking could amount to 
half of their daily wages. ‘And then how can we buy other necessities?’ women asked whilst 
promised gas, water and other facilities during elections, slumdwellers lament that none of 
these promises are fulfilled after victory. 
 
Respondents in Ward A discussed their disappointment with local leaders. Representatives 
had visited the slum to enlist the names and addresses of slumdwellers. They claimed that 
they were providing Government with information regarding the size of the slum, which 
could be used to distribute basic necessities such as rice, tin and dal. Residents never heard 
from them again, and slumdwellers believe that instead, they sold the goods back to the 
market. They believe that Government officials receive goods allocated for the poor, but that 
these goods and benefits never reach poor households. 
Informal Leaders/Mastaans 
 
Respondents noted the important role played by the informal leaders of the slum in problem 
solving. These individuals portray a conflicting battle. On one hand, respondents recognised 
their necessity for mediating with officials and connecting slumdwellers to service providers 
and political contacts. ‘It is not possible for a government to reach each and every 
household’, one respondent suggested, ‘so it is better to select a person who can take care for 
the slumdwellers’.  
 
At the same time, however, these leaders are the source of much fear and harm amongst the 
slumdwellers. The description of the role played by these leaders suggests that much of their 
legitimacy is reliant upon the fear of slumdwellers.  
 
One focus group detailed that the leaders were not good people. Many are drug addicts or 
drink alcohol, do not work, and threaten weaker residents. They are vicious and do not 
respect the women or the elderly, but are free from reprimand because of their affiliation with 
the Ward Commissioner and political leaders. On one occasion, the police asked the 
slumdwellers to assist them catch criminals in the slum. After turning over one alleged 
criminal to the police, the slumdwellers did not receive the gratitude that they were promised. 
Instead, the criminal was released from jail with help from ‘the black link of administration’ 
– officials allowed him to bribe himself out of jail. On his return, he began to torture families 
who had helped to seize him, and the police would not step in to protect them. This helps to 
illustrate how ordinary slumdwellers are at the mercy of mastaans who are controlled by 
higher authorities. ‘Political parties protect all the terrorists and no one can do anything 
against them10’, stated one discussion group. 
 
                                                 
10 Please note that the use of the word ‘terrorist’ by slumdwellers is a synonym for ‘criminal’. It has no reference 
to the connotations that the word ‘terrorist’ invokes in today’s global context. 
 13
Banks: A Tale of Two Wards                                                                                                                  CGS WP 2 
Those experiences with local leaders described by slumdwellers matches the concept of the 
‘mastaan’. The mastaan is a ‘creation of the elite and politicians’ (Rashid, 2004). The 
mastaan fills the institutional gap divide that excludes the poor from services, providing 
connections to slumdwellers at vastly inflated prices. Political parties rely on links with local 
mastaans for support and re-election (Rashid and Hossain 2005), by providing guaranteed 
votebanks in return for services. In comparison to services accessed legally, these informal 
channels involve significantly higher costs. Rashid and Hossain estimate that poor 
households pay up to three times for electricity as legally-connected (Rashid and Hossain 
2005). One focus group identified that they paid up to three taka per litre of water. 
 
Respondents also suggested that slum leaders were able to capture resources that were 
provided to the slum. ‘The leader grasped all the facilities and relief goods provided by 
highlighting our difficulties, and nothing is provided for us’. This phenomenon, of mastaans 
capturing the supply of Government and NGO-provided facilities and services has been 
identified as a significant barrier to service delivery interventions within slums. 
Landowners and Other ‘Influential’ People 
 
Slumdwellers in Ward A identified that instead of the Ward Commissioner, their land owner, 
a large property developer, was actually their first port of call for problem-solving. The major 
advantage they specify with the landlord is his political neutrality. Other avenues, such as 
community elders or Ward Commissioners, respondents associated with political bias. ‘We 
cannot get political justice (through elders or the Ward Commissioner) because he always 
gives support of his party fellow’. Slumdwellers also note the uncertainty that they face at the 
hands of the landowner. ‘We pay him rent, but if he orders us to leave this place, we must 
leave’. In Ward B, the slum is situated on Government-owned land, so no comparable 
relationship exists. 
 
Another actor identified in Ward A was the son of a local influential person. He plans to run 
as Ward Commissioner in the next election when the current Commissioner stands down. 
With the support and affiliation of the Ward Commissioner he is involving himself in ward 
affairs to generate a positive social image before the election. One respondent detailed that 
his rickshaw had been stolen by miscreants. The Ward Commissioner referred him to the 
aforementioned person, who was able to retrieve the rickshaw. 
Police 
 
Slumdwellers identify harassment by the police force as a major difficulty that they face. 
Increasingly in Dhaka, the police have been used for political ends. Prior to any large 
opposition party parade or demonstration, respondents state that the police arrest large 
numbers of slumdwellers. ‘In such a time, the police are given some target to arrest a fixed 
number of people. It is easy to access a slum, so they arrest people from here, whether they 
are involved in politics or not’. Although the police should be a separate entity from 
Government, they are increasingly being used for political means. As a result they exist as a 
major disturbance to the lives of slumdwellers, ‘whose greatest hope is to escape harassment 
by the police and public officials (Kamal, 2000: 7). 
  
Experiences with the police force increase the costs of economic participation for 
slumdwellers. One respondent mentioned that one of his rickshaws was seized by the police 
because it had no license. Unable to pay a bribe for its return, the police kept it. Although 
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recognising the legitimacy of his punishment, he stated, ‘But I have been punished. But the 
rich can avoid the punishment, and they are much bigger thieves’. The slumdwellers lament 
the lack of rule of law for the rich, viewing their ability to escape from punishment because 
of their wealth and resources. The poor cannot afford to bribe themselves out of escaping 
punishment. A lack of rule of law therefore is a much greater burden on the poor, who are 
vulnerable due their lack of power and money. ‘The poor have to suffer all kinds of hazard 
either in police or political action’, stipulate slumdwellers. They detail that sometimes 
innocent slumdwellers are retained in jail because the police demanded unaffordable bribes 
for their release. 
 
The preceding discussion has identified the main actors slumdwellers interact with for 
problem solving or access provision. However, the analysis shows that even those that can 
help the poor can also harm them. Although viewed as an integral part of the slum’s social 
hierarchy, slum leaders also generate considerable fear. Landlords, while renting their land 
and helping to resolve grievances, can at any time evict them. The police offer no help or 
protection to the poor, and are viewed as protecting only the rich or powerful, including 
criminals. They identify both NGOs and Government as manipulating their miseries to gain 
funds, of which only a small proportion reaches them.  
 
Many of these problems have resulted from a lack of formal and legitimate channels for 
service provision and facilities. Laws prohibiting service provision to slums, for example, 
allows the creation of the mastaan, who provides services at the same time as exploiting the 
poor. Attempts to overcome such problems therefore, require formalised and legitimate 
relationships regarding land ownership and service delivery. It is also evident that NGOs 
working in urban areas may need to review their operations and make coordinated efforts to 
match the needs of the urban poor. 
 
3.4 What’s in a Vote? 
 
Universally viewing the vote as an important citizen right, how do slumdwellers cast their 
vote and how do they view their influence on Government once they have given their vote? It 
is important to note that slumdwellers did not distinguish between Government and Local 
Government (DCC). Although the Ward Commissioner is a visible representative, unless 
discussions stipulated ‘the Ward Commissioner’, discussions quickly switched to 
Government at a national level. 
 
Female respondents in Ward B highlighted the importance of the voting rights that 
slumdwellers now experience. ‘Without this vote, we have no importance to them. Only 
during election times do they come to us seeking votes, and in this time we feel ourselves 
stronger than them’. This identifies the idea of a ‘subordinate’ poor – people take advantage 
of them, while the wealthy are free from troubles and harassment because they have money 
and power. Thus, voting is a hugely important process for them, as this is the only time in 
which they feel that they hold social and political power. 
 
Throughout all focus groups it became clear that the poor’s perception of governance is 
closely linked to their peace and security. They identified major improvements in the 
reduction of terrorism solely with the efforts of the present Government and the introduction 
of RAB (Rapid Action Battalion, Bangladesh’s ‘elite’ police force). ‘We give our vote for 
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keeping security and peace’, stated one focus group. Another group said that, ‘At present, we 
are living in a peaceful and sound environment because of RAB’. Under the previous regime, 
miscreants, hoodlums, thieves and criminals were common across the city. The last BNP 
Government (2001-2006) is therefore closely associated with the reduction of crime. Crime 
reduction was a major vote winner for Ward Commissioners in both wards, and a primary 
focal point in their campaigning. 
 
Discussions with slumdwellers in Ward A highlighted the lack of accountability of elected 
representatives. ‘It is our right to vote’, stated one focus group, ‘but after this, it is not our 
affair if the leader does not undertake development works’. While they view their vote as a 
very important right, after they have voted they see nothing that they can do to hold the Ward 
Commissioner to account. Kamal (2000) identifies accountability as the missing link that 
ensures the poor lack the ability to convey their voices for political change. While they enjoy 
voting rights, they have no voice to force pro-active reforms exercising their majority in the 
electoral system (Kamal 2000).  
 
These distinctions help to explain the feelings of neglect and disillusionment experienced by 
slumdwellers in Ward A.11 They feel that the Ward Commissioner has not fulfilled the 
minimum requirements for retaining his legitimacy. For this reason, slumdwellers feel 
detached from the social and political fabric of the Ward - their duty begins and ends with the 
voting process. After the vote, the Ward Commissioner can choose to work or not to work, 
but this has nothing to do with the slumdwellers. Crucially, in Ward A, slumdwellers could 
see no platform through which to press their demands on, or even meet with, their Ward 
Commissioner. Instead their priorities are focused on dealing with day-to-day survival.  
 
Slumdwellers in Ward A were hugely disillusioned by their experiences with the Ward 
Commissioner. ‘We cast votes in the hope that they might bring something positive for our 
well-being’, they specify, yet they are repeatedly disappointed. During campaigning, 
candidates frequented the slums to ask for their vote. Yet after winning the vote, he never 
visits the slum or takes heed in their affairs. Instead, residents see that the Ward 
Commissioner’s first priority is maintaining social relationships with the rich. ‘We are valued 
less because we are poor, and our votes are valueless’, stated one respondent. Disappointed 
at the Ward Commissioner’s neglect, female respondents stipulated that, ‘We have decided 
that no votes will be cast in the next election’.  
 
Why were slumdwellers in Ward A quietly accepting of a Government which neglects their 
needs?12 In research on popular expectations on Government, Ali and Hossain (2006) explain 
that in part, this may be because some action has been taken that has improved their 
livelihoods (Ali and Hossain, 2006: 4). Respondents in all focus groups praised the 
Government for its efforts in eradicating terrorism through RAB. With the eradication of the 
regular extortion of payments, muggings and other forms of criminality, the improvement in 
slumdwellers lives were very pronounced in discussions. ‘These changes seem a big factor to 
us, because during the last Government we got nothing’, stated one focus group.  
                                                 
11 Berg-Schlosser and Kersting (2003) details experiences of ‘marginalised personality’, associated with a lack 
of participation and long-term perspectives (Berg-Schlosser and Kersting, 2003: 4). 
12 An important discrepancy must be noted with regards to the repeated re-election of a Ward Commissioner 
who has continually disappointed his poor residents. In this instance, it may be that seeing their vote as 
‘valueless’, the helpless situation faced by slumdwellers in Ward A may encourage them to get what they can in 
exchange for their vote. See Kamal 2000 and Bergman-Schlesser and Kersting 2000 for information regarding 
the undermining of independent political representation of the poor. 
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This does not entail overall satisfaction, however. At the same time slumdwellers are very 
conscious of Government policies which have made their livelihoods more difficult, with one 
rickshaw puller stating that, ‘...but they have hurt the poor like me, so I will not vote for this 
Government again’. Policies implemented under this regime like the rickshaw ban on 
highways and main roads have had significant detrimental impacts on the livelihoods of the 
poor. The price index of basic goods is also a crucial indicator for poor households regarding 
Government performance. Focus groups argued that a good government should at the very 
least control the price of basic goods. One even suggested that Government should subsidise 
these staples. However, slumdwellers view that any subsidies in society in fact go to the rich. 
‘Government reduces the price of houses and cars in the budget, but these are for the rich. It 
is never for our necessities’, stated one group. This was matched by other groups, who 
suggested that, ‘We are always the deprived group’. 
 
These insights do indicate that slumdwellers vote on performance rather than party affiliation, 
in particular on how Government policies and programmes impact upon their lives. Ali and 
Hossain suggest that, ‘…poor Bangladeshis see the vote as a referendum on the incumbent 
government, and their votes are based on their evaluation of the incumbent’s performance 
rather than the challenger’s leadership styles or policies’ (Ali and Hossain, 2006: 22). This 
viewpoint was confirmed by female respondents in Ward B who stated that, ‘A vote does not 
help us anyway, but in this way we express our liking and disliking’. CUP also suggests that 
one major improvement in political participation is that slumdwellers are now more 
politically aware. Consequently, they judge Government performance on tangible outcomes 
of programmes and policies that have direct impacts upon their livelihoods, rather than party 
rhetoric. Male respondents, for example, confirmed that they would not vote for this 
Government again because of the harm it has done their livelihoods. Kamal (2000) identifies 
the high levels of enthusiasm in the political process as evidenced by the continuously high 
election turnouts (Kamal 2000).  
 
Numerous groups identified their disillusionment with the broken promises of past and 
previous governments. ‘Candidates bestow their heads and hands to us during the election, 
but the same candidates kick us after the election’, specified one group. ‘They tell us that they 
will work for us, and give us roads and services, and that they will clean the dust from our 
legs’, stated one female respondent, ‘but first they have to clean their hearts’. Not only does 
this show disillusionment with successive governments, but also with the campaigning and 
voting process itself, which allows the victorious candidates or Government to renege on 
their promises once they gain power.  
 
3.5 Poverty and Social Exclusion 
 
Although poverty is a multi-dimensional deprivation, focus group discussions highlighted the 
direct relationship between their lack of money and their social and political exclusion. The 
poor identify a lack of money as their main impediment to social and political recognition; 
attribute this to their lack of power vis-à-vis Ward Commissioners and the Government. In a 
society where the rich reap the benefits, the voices of the poor are not heard. ‘Everywhere in 
your life requires money if you want to benefit from any facilities or advantages’, stated one 
focus group. In a system of governance that equates power and access with wealth, the poor 
feel that they will always lose out. Slumdwellers could envision no place for the poor in 
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Dhaka’s future – ‘the poor will probably not survive in Dhaka city in the future because all 
property goes to the rich in Bangladesh’. Neither municipal nor national Government is seen 
as pro-poor. In the interactions of slumdwellers with society, society is characterised by rules 
that are made and broken by the rich; where the rich go unpunished and capture the lion’s 
share of resources and subsidies. This viewpoint is portrayed through statements such as ‘The 
Government always puts oil in the oily hands’, in Ward B and, ‘the Ward Commissioner 
maintains healthy relationships with the rich’, in Ward A. 
 
‘We are living in such circumstances where our might is our right’, suggested respondents in 
Ward A. Female respondents shared this sentiment, stating that if slumdwellers could come 
together, then many crucial problems could be solved. They also identified that this process 
of collective mobilisation would be the only way pressurise Ward Commissioners or the 
Government. Slumdwellers in Ward A recognise that those who possess a voice against 
oppression can facilitate reconciliation, but can envision no channel through which they can 
utilise this power. With matters of daily survival taking priority, their lack of money prevents 
them from attempting to overcome political marginalisation.  
 
Attempts have been made, however, to facilitate the mobilisation of slumdwellers in order to 
hold municipal government to account. Section four details the achievements of Coalition for 
the Urban Poor’s BOSC programme.  
 
4. Mobilisation of Slumdwellers: Lessons from BOSC 
4.1 A Framework for Participation  
 
In 1997, Khan identified that ‘The poor’s exclusion from local urban bodies is complete. 
They simply have no means through which to directly or indirectly participate in the 
deliberations of such bodies and influence decisions’ (Khan 1997). To overcome barriers to 
effective participation Khan recommended the mobilisation and conscientisation of NGOs 
and community-based organisations. CUP’s Basti Basheer Odhikar Surakha Committee 
(BOSC) programme has initiated progress in this sphere and laid the foundations for further 
improvement. 
  
The initiation of BOSC in 2000 aimed to provide a non-violent alternative to the violent 
rallies, protests and demonstrations that had previously been the main forum for staging the 
voices of the poor. The programme created a network of local committees through which 
slumdwellers could organise themselves and press their demands upon Local Government. It 
aimed to create accountability mechanisms for the urban poor and to incorporate 
slumdwellers into the urban governance process.  
 
The Ward Commissioner-citizen relationship can be viewed as a service-provider 
relationship. The method of payment is a vote, and the services provided are, ideally, those 
facets of good governance which render the local government responsive and accountable to 
the needs of the slumdwellers.13 The World Development Report (2004) can provide insight 
into the abilities of the poor to participate in accountable urban governance. It also highlights 
                                                 
13 This chain will, however, fall apart in instances where there is no accountability or legitimacy for the poor, as 
we have seen in the case of Ward A, where slumdwellers identify that after they cast their vote, there is nothing 
that they can do if the Ward Commissioner chooses not to look after their interests. 
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the argument for decentralisation – bringing ‘good governance’ within the reach of the poor, 
so that they can participate, monitor, and hold elected officials accountable. Figure 2 
illustrates the World Development Report framework for service accountability to the poor. 
A modified framework is shown on the right that illustrates the ability of the poor to 
participate in urban governance. 
Figure 2: The Long and Short Routes to Accountability 
 
 
Source: (World Bank, 2004) 
Policy-
makers 
Policy-
makers
Poor 
People 
Service 
Providers 
BOSC 
Committees
Ward 
Commissioner 
World Development Report 2004 The poor are reliant on ‘the short route to 
accountability’ for getting their voices 
heard by policy makers (DCC).  
The ‘long route to accountability’ follows 
the shaded arrows above. Service users 
influence policy-makers, who then ensure 
service providers provide better services. 
 
With direct access to policymakers 
blocked, relationships with Ward 
Commissioner are crucial for 
incorporating the poor into the governance 
process. In this sense, the Ward 
Commissioner acts as a gatekeeper and 
intermediary. If this relationship breaks 
down, the poor’s voices do not reach 
policymakers. 
 
Given the difficulties in strengthening the 
long road to accountability, the WDR 
emphasises that the ‘short route to 
accountability’ is crucial, allowing service 
users to press demands directly on service 
providers. 
 
As suggested by CUP, Ward Commissioners should provide a platform of access between the 
poor and DCC. The Ward Commissioner is the gatekeeper, in a sense, to the poor’s 
participation in the wider system of governance. If this relationship breaks down, then 
‘service delivery fails’ – the voices of the poor do not reach DCC. As the most local 
representative of Government, Ward Commissioners incorporate poor communities into the 
whole governance structure of DCC. 
 
The ‘gatekeeper’ role is not limited to Ward Commissioners. With a multitude of agencies 
involved in DCC’s governance, in many cases the Ward Commissioner is not the right actor 
on whom to press demands. CUP plays a vital role, helping BOSC to access and 
communicate with the relevant agencies or service providers. However, CUP aims to create a 
sustainable network where slumdwellers themselves play the major role; while playing a 
major role in instigating BOSC committees, CUP’s role is progressively becoming limited to 
one of support. 
  
The BOSC network is split into four sub-committees; Primary Committees; Ward 
Committees; Thana Committees; and one Central Committee. Primary Committees are the 
most local committee, with the Central Committee heading the entire BOSC network in 
Dhaka. Across Dhaka, there are 404 Primary Committees, 90 Ward Committees (one per 
Ward), 29 Thana Committees, and one Central Committee.14 This information suggests that 
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6,060 slumdwellers have membership of the BOSC network. Against the overall slum 
population of Dhaka city, this constitutes around 0.18 percent of slumdwellers. 
 
The four lower tiers of committees consist of fifteen members, headed by one President, two 
Vice-Presidents, one Secretary, one Vice-Secretary and ten members. Gender balance is 
always maintained as 7:8 or 8:7. Primary committees are formed by direct vote within every 
500-1000 households. If there are 15 primary committees in a Ward, then the Ward 
Committee is elected from the members of those primary committees. In the same way, thana 
committees are elected with members of the ward committees. Finally, the central committee 
is formed with members of the thana committees by a direct voting process.15 
 
Primary committees are the first calling point for slumdwellers. They deal with localised 
problems such as rainwater removal, problems with electricity, or quarrels among residents. 
Any problems out with their control are passed onto the ward committee to solve. If the 
problem is still too big it will be transferred to the thana committee. At the top of this 
hierarchy, the Central Committee exists to solve city-wide problems concerning 
slumdwellers, such as land tenure, resistance to eviction or legal service provision. Members 
of the Central Committee are the major participants in urban governance, representing 
slumdwellers across the city. It is at this level that the slumdwellers communicate and press 
demands upon Ward Commissioners, service providers and other agents. 
 
4.2 Achievements and Accomplishments 
 
‘BOSC has been one hundred percent success’ claimed female BOSC members. BOSC has 
been responsible for securing legal water and electricity connections to slums. Land holding 
laws render it illegal for utilities to provide legal connections to slums. This is to the 
detriment of slums, service providers, and citizens across the entire city. Slumdwellers must 
rely on mastaans for services. Service providers and customers suffer from revenue loss and 
irregular supply. CUP facilitated a meeting between BOSC and the Minister of Power in the 
Secretariat. Through discussion and debate BOSC members acted as a catalyst for the 
provision of services. Consequently, DESA is now committed to providing electricity to 
slums (BURT 2005). In addition, BOSC committees are also actively involved with the 
provision of legal water connections. 
 
With household electricity connections infeasible due to the unsound nature of housing, 
BOSC Primary Committees helped to overcome technical difficulties in electricity provision. 
After meters were installed per twenty households, Primary Committees were responsible for 
mobilising a committee to look after each meter and ensure regular payments. Thus, 
community participation and ownership is mobilised from the very outset of provision, which 
has proven to have the most successful outcomes in sustainability and cost recovery (Rashid 
and Hossain 2005).  
 
CUP tries to involve Ward Commissioners in a supervisory role in operations and 
maintenance committees, as this incorporates the committees in the urban governance 
system. There is a significant distinction between ‘active’ and ‘passive’ Ward Commissioners 
however. ‘Active’ Ward Commissioners, participate in these committees. In Ward B, the 
                                                 
15 See Appendix Two for a graphical representation the BOSC network formation. 
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Ward Commissioner was praised by both slumdwellers and CUP for having shown his 
commitment and support to slumdwellers. ‘Passive’ Ward Commissioners, on the other hand, 
do not actively oppose projects, but do not participate in them either. 
 
Apart from tangible achievements such as service provision, membership of BOSC has had 
additional benefits for female members. ‘We can talk now. We can go outside of the house 
and we are familiar to each other. We might not have financial help, but we have mental 
strength now.’ Without further study, it is impossible to assert the depth of empowerment 
accompanies female membership, but certain conclusions can be drawn. Previously, women 
mentioned that they had to stay at home, building houses and running their households. Now 
they talk amongst themselves and have influence on matters affecting their communities. 
Some of the women are even President of their respective Primary Committees, and hold 
respected positions of power. They are more aware of political issues, and showed a great 
deal of understanding of local politics.  
 
Both male and female BOSC members seemed more aware of election ‘tactics’. In Ward B, 
male respondents indicated that the Ward Commissioner has promised that he will implement 
more work in the area if he is elected in the upcoming election. The women remarked that 
recently the Ward Commissioner had erected street lights in the slum, ‘It is election politics. 
He gives us street lights at the end of his time because he thinks that people will vote for him 
again’.  
 
Female respondents revealed a subtle political awareness: they view the last local election as 
‘biased’. Another popular BNP candidate was expected to win. He was very popular amongst 
the constituency, but had not been backed by his party. Instead the BNP party backed the 
present Ward Commissioner, whom they suggested was not so popular at the time. The latter 
Commissioner however, was still elected. In addition they note, no Awami League candidate 
stood for Ward Commissioner. Consequently a lack of choice for Awami League supporters 
meant that the election was not fair. 
 
In contrast to non-BOSC respondents, who detailed experiences that had directly affected 
their livelihoods, BOSC discussions covered national and city-wide issues, such as the 
neglect of the poor in the national budget. They also seemed more aware of issues 
surrounding NGO and Government services, and held stronger opinions. Their discussions 
were not limited to specific examples of their interactions with these actors, but covered 
citywide phenomenon. 
 
BOSC members are more politically aware because they have the most direct contact with the 
Ward Commissioner and Government officials. It was clear that non-BOSC households in 
Ward B themselves never saw the Ward Commissioner, but had heard through other 
slumdwellers that their Ward Commissioner was a good man. Slumdwellers also informed us 
that the Ward Commissioner helped to supervise BOSC activities and NGO involvements in 
the slum, which requires regular communications and interaction. How do the achievements 
of BOSC impact upon non-members in the slum? 
 
4.3 The Wider Impact of BOSC Activities 
 
The research has distinguished between three distinct groups of slumdwellers. First are those 
‘active’ households who hold membership within the BOSC network. ‘Non-active’ 
 21
Banks: A Tale of Two Wards                                                                                                                  CGS WP 2 
households can be split into two groups; non-BOSC households in a slum where the BOSC 
network is active, and households in a slum where there is no coverage of BOSC. Differences 
between the three groups illustrate the impact that BOSC has on both its members and non-
members within BOSC slums. The major difference that can be identified is in participation. 
While BOSC members experienced direct participation in both slum affairs and urban 
governance, non-BOSC members had no direct participation in these matters. 
 
At the top end of the spectrum, BOSC committees have very positive impacts on committee 
members. Membership increases their awareness, gains contacts with Government and non-
government officials and allows their voices to represent slumdwellers across Dhaka. It also 
has a significant effect on the empowerment of female slumdwellers. 
 
Looking at the composition of BOSC committees themselves, it is clear that those who are 
elected are the more respected and relatively ‘better off’ amongst the slumdwellers. Members 
are directly elected by a hand-vote amongst residents - this suggests that those with 
leadership status, contacts, knowledge and confidence are selected for these positions. BOSC 
respondents held more respected jobs, being either Government service holders or small 
business owners. Their ability to spare the time to partake in BOSC activities, which are not 
financially supported, also suggests that they do not have the same urgent focus on their 
immediate day-to-day survival as indicated by non-BOSC respondents. Their relative 
position is furthered by BOSC membership – they have access to contacts with Ward 
Commissioner, and more frequent access to higher classes and networks for jobs outside the 
industries of garments and rickshaw-pulling.  
 
‘Non-active’ households within Ward B indirectly benefit from BOSC activities. Not only to 
they receive the services and rights achieved by BOSC committees, respondents were also 
more aware than their counterparts in Ward A, but solely by word of mouth rather than direct 
experience. This was particularly poignant with the women, who stated that politics was an 
affair solely for men. ‘We are female so politics is not our subject. We are busy with our work 
and the rest of the time we are busy with family affairs’. This is in stark contrast to the more 
empowered view of female BOSC respondents previously illustrated. Although female 
slumdwellers in Ward B had heard about the BOSC committee, it was through their 
husbands. Consequently, they knew little of the detail, stating that, ‘We heard about a 
committee here, but we don’t know much about it’. 
 
Slumdwellers in Ward A revealed the most obstacles to political participation. With no 
BOSC coverage in their area, they had never heard of the network or its aims and objectives. 
They had no interactions with the Ward Commissioner and were very disillusioned with the 
voting process. Lacking an avenue through which they could press their demands, there was 
no way that slumdwellers could affect whether or not the Ward Commissioner carried out his 
duties. Faced with the hardships of day to day survival, matters of political participation were 
pushed aside. 
 
Although non-BOSC slumdwellers in Ward B were also busy concentrating on their 
immediate livelihoods, and could not spare time to interact with Ward Commissioners and 
other political affairs, discussion groups did not identify the same amount of resignation that 
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was discovered in Ward A. Here, this phenomenon coupled with a complete lack of 
participation apart from the voting process itself, has led to their marginalised personalities.16  
 
Hence, in comparing the experiences of non-BOSC slumdwellers in both Wards A and B, one 
can note that slumdwellers do benefit somewhat from the wider impact of BOSC committees 
in their vicinity. Although not benefiting from direct participation in urban governance, 
respondents in Ward B were more politically aware and optimistic. They did not indicate the 
complete lack of direct participation that slumdwellers in Ward B suffered. 
 
4.4 Limits to Political Participation  
 
CUP has broken ground in political participation of the urban poor at the local level through 
the facilitation of the BOSC network. However, the achievements of BOSC activities are 
limited to the local, municipal level of DCC. In addition to this, however, improvements in 
the livelihoods of poor urban slumdwellers need national recognition, through reflecting 
urban poverty in Bangladesh’s policy agenda. Although verbal commitments for urban 
poverty reduction have been made, it is imperative that these are translated into a national 
policy for the urban poor, which can then be used to hold the government to account.  
 
Within Bangladesh’s highly-centralised structure of governance, grassroots mobilisation is 
not sufficient to generate national change. Consequently, even in light of successes in 
political participation for the urban poor, there remains a lack of recognition of urban poverty 
in national policy and political action. A lack of decentralisation undermines successes in 
political representation by limiting the voices of the poor to the local level. Consequently, 
although initiatives such as BOSC can have significant impacts and achievements in 
participation at the local level, there are no avenues through which slumdwellers can 
influence national policy. The impacts of grassroots mobilisation efforts are not far-reaching 
enough to be reflected in policy or priority due to the weakness of DCC in relation to Central 
Government. 
 
Coalition for the Urban Poor (CUP) stresses the importance of generating simultaneously 
both ‘bottom-up’ and ‘top-down’ advocacy work in fighting for the rights of the urban poor. 
Community mobilisation at the local level must be complemented with advocacy work within 
Central Government to encourage national policy change. Major change requires policy 
advocacy within the highest levels of Government where political will and power are 
concentrated. CUP has made progress in this sphere through two avenues.  
 
The representation of CUP on the Dhaka Good Governance Committee, directly within the 
Prime Minister’s Office, brings voice to the urban poor where it was previously neglected. 
CUP presence on this committee brings considerations of the poor into the search for 
solutions to city-wide problems. CUP detail that deficiencies are not solely due to a matter of 
neglect, but also of ignorance, and has taken strides to overcome a lack of awareness amongst 
policy makers through this channel. 
 
                                                 
16 Berg-Schlosser and Kersting (2003) describes this ‘marginalised personality’ as is a direct result of dealing 
with the hardships of daily life. This results in the inability to focus on long-term perspectives. A subsequent 
lack of participation can lead to fatalism and resignation (Berg-Schlosser and Kersting, 2003: 4). 
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At a national level, CUP has formed the Bangladesh Urban Round Table (BURT) to 
strengthen its advocacy powers. This includes CUP’s 53 member organisations and advocates 
from highly visible organisations such as the World Bank, ICDDRB, The United Nations, 
and ADB. The importance and impact of advocacy work at the national level can be 
illustrated by BURT’s successes. When the draft PRSP was distributed, for example, it made 
no accommodations for urban poverty. Subsequent advocacy work by BURT facilitated the 
incorporation of urban poverty into the final PRSP, although a relatively small focal point.  
 
Thus, while recognising the limitations of grassroots mobilisation of the poor, CUP 
complements the activities of the poor with advocacy work within Central Government. The 
ultimate aim is to generate firm policy commitments. Commitment would allow the poor 
themselves to hold Government to account, thus extending successes in political participation 
for the urban poor made at the local level to the national level. 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Bangladesh’s turbulent political circumstances, as referred to in the opening quotation, have 
not only held back the country’s development, but have also directly harmed the most 
vulnerable of its citizens by limiting access to elected officials and basic necessities. In urban 
Dhaka this is prominent through the difficulties faced by slumdwellers with regards to 
political affiliation. Water connections were refused on the basis of the slum being identified 
as under Awami League influence. Respondents also suggested that relationships and 
problem-solving were only and option for those affiliated with the Ward Commissioner’s 
party. How can the poor influence policy making in such tenuous circumstances?  
 
The voting process is identified as an important citizen right for two reasons. Firstly, it is the 
mechanism through which they can evaluate the Government with regards to the impacts that 
policy and performance have had on their lives. This concurs with literature that suggests that 
people cast votes with regards to performance rather than party affiliation. In addition, it also 
empowers slumdwellers, who identify that the election period is the only time in which they 
hold power over Government and are not kept in a subordinate position. Although the voting 
process is accessible to all slumdwellers, the depth of participation beyond this varies. 
 
Experiences of slumdwellers within the two wards studied illustrates that participation in 
urban governance is possible, but by no means the norm. Initiatives such as BOSC coupled 
with an active Ward Commissioner has taken great strides in incorporating slumdwellers into 
the structure of urban governance. Slumdwellers without such a platform for conveying their 
voices have had very different experiences. 
 
In Ward A, the democratic municipal elections have done little to improve the rights, 
participation or livelihoods of slumdwellers. Over and above the voting process there is no 
accessible avenue through which they can press their demands on elected officials. While 
expectations are low – merely that the Ward Commissioner ‘keep in touch’ – even these 
remain unfulfilled. Although recognising that collective mobilisation is imperative for getting 
their voices heard, their poverty, defined by a lack of wealth and power, holds them back. A 
quiet resignation was inherent within respondents, who argued that it was not their duty to 
ensure that the Ward Commissioner met his responsibilities. Disillusionment was such that 
female respondents indicated that they may not vote in the next election. 
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In face of a lack of avenues for participation, slumdwellers rely on a network of other social 
actors to fulfil their needs, such as landlords, slum leaders and NGOs. However, in scrutiny 
of their experiences it becomes clear that these relationships, although bringing positive 
benefits to the poor, also have the ability to harm them. Negative interactions with the police 
increase their vulnerability. 
 
A lack of accountability can be found at the heart of problems regarding the participation of 
slumdwellers. After voting, slumdwellers in Ward A could envision no route through which 
to press their demands or even ensure that the Ward Commissioner fulfilled his duties. In 
contrast, in Ward B, BOSC committees have enhanced the political capabilities of members 
by creating a channel through which committees can press their demands and hold elected 
officials to account. Accountability is the crucial ‘link’ here – the BOSC network ensures that 
accountability mechanisms are utilised to make local elected officials responsive to the needs 
of their poor electorate. 
 
In Ward B, democracy has led to much greater participation and expectations, and opened up 
avenues through which slumdwellers can improve their livelihoods. With the assistance of 
BOSC, slumdwellers are now mobilised to press demands upon Ward Commissioners, 
service providers and other authorities. The successes of BOSC are partly attributed by an 
active Ward Commissioner, who in the eyes of the slumdwellers, is a good man who takes 
concern in the lives of the poor. As well as helping with general problem resolution in the 
slum, he also is actively involved in NGO programmes and BOSC activities. Such 
interactions help to incorporate the poor into the wider structure of urban governance. Even 
non-BOSC respondents in Ward B displayed more positive sentiments with regards to 
expectations and experiences of the Ward Commissioner. The experience of Ward B 
illustrates that initiatives such as BOSC provide a forum through which Ward Commissioners 
can engage their poor communities, and in the process incorporate them into the urban 
governance structure. 
 
The successes of BOSC illustrate the possibilities for incorporating the urban poor into local 
municipal governance. The urban poor however, remain a neglected socioeconomic class at 
the national level, with successes in grassroots mobilisation limited to the local level. 
Coalition for the Urban Poor complements its grassroots mobilisation of the poor with top-
down advocacy work to encourage Government to translate verbal commitments into a 
comprehensive urban policy for poverty reduction. This can then be used to hold Government 
to account, thus extending successes in participation made in municipal governance to the 
national level. 
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Appendix One: Structure of BOSC Network 
 
 
Primary Committees (404): 
One committee has fifteen members 
Ward Committees (90): 
Members from fifteen primary committees make up 
one ward committee. 
Thana Committees (29): 
Members from fifteen ward committees make up one 
thana committee 
Primary Committee (1): 
Fifteen members elected from thana committees 
across the city. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
